Kamran Safi v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Lord Justice Bean (Vice-President, Court of Appeal, Civil Division):

1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) against the decision of the First Tier Tribunal (“FTT”) to allow the appeal of the Respondent Kamran Safi on Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR grounds against his deportation to Afghanistan. The decision of the FTT was upheld by the Upper Tribunal (“UT”).

2. The Respondent is a citizen of Afghanistan, born on 1 February 1997. He grew up in Baghlan province with his family. In 2008 his father, who worked for the Afghan army, was murdered after being visited by a group of armed men.

3. The Respondent arrived in the UK as a minor aged 13 (on the Home Office’s case; 12 years 10 months on his case) and claimed asylum on arrival. This was refused as it was not accepted that removal would engage Article 2, 3 or 8 ECHR. Mr Safi was granted 3 years discretionary leave to remain (“DLR”) on the basis that he was an asylum-seeking child. In 2013, the Respondent learned that his remaining family in Afghanistan (his mother and sister) had died.

4. The Respondent claims that he has been a victim of childhood trafficking and modern slavery, including sexual abuse, which took place during his journey to the UK. He continues to suffer severely poor mental health, having been diagnosed with complex post-traumatic stress disorder and mild depression.

5. On 4 June 2015 the SSHD served a notice of intention to make a deportation order. A further such notice was served in April 2018.

6. On 2 April 2019 the SSHD made a deportation order. The notice of decision referred to Mr Safi’s criminal convictions. By far the most significant of these was his conviction at Croydon Crown Court on 15 January 2016 for aggravated burglary and theft from a person. He was sentenced to six years and six months detention in a Young Offender’s Institution. The notice quotes the remarks of the sentencing judge, Miss Recorder Charles. After describing the facts of the offence, she addressed the defendant as follows:- “… you were 17 almost 18 at the time of the offence. You have 17 offences recorded against you including six non dwelling burglaries. You have been the subject of a detention and training order in the past, but again there is nothing of this nature on your record and in your case no previous violence save offences of obstruction of a police officer. I have read in your case the very helpful psychiatric report of Dr. Durkin which outlines the traumatic start you had in life. Traumatic is a word that is often used in these courts and it is seldom meant, but that is the true description of what you suffered in your early life. It also outlined the difficulties you have faced since.” The decision letter rejected the argument that there would be very significant obstacles to Mr Safi’s integration into Afghanistan. It concluded that in the view of the Secretary of State there were no compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in deportation. The claims under ECHR Article 3 (on medical grounds) and Article 8 were rejected.

7. On 31 May 2019 the SSHD considered further submissions in which Mr Safi claimed risk from the Taliban on return as his father had been killed as a member of the Afghan army. Those submissions were refused as not amounting to a fresh claim. The FTT appeal

8. Mr Safi appealed under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“ the 2002 Act ”) against the Respondent’s decision dated 2 April 2019 to refuse his human rights claim.

9. On 11 April 2023 a directions hearing was held (by CVP) before FTT Judge Rodger. This included a note that “all A’s evidence has been served and now down to R to review the case due to a change in country circumstances”. R (i.e. the Home Office) was directed to carry out a review within 7 weeks of the documents disclosed in the supplementary bundle filed by Mr Safi’s solicitors. This included five experts’ reports, which between them ran to 210 pages: i) January 2023 country expert report of Mr Tim Foxley MBE; ii) 25 January 2023 trafficking risk report of Dr Imranali Panjwani; iii) 9 March 2023 forensic psychologist report of Ms Keri Nixon; iv) 12 August 2021 medico-legal report of Dr David Rigby; v) 20 February 2023 addendum medico-legal report of Dr Rigby.

10. The Home Office was also directed to obtain a copy of the sentencing remarks of the Recorder at Croydon Crown Court, from which I have quoted above.

11. On 17 July 2023 FTT Judge Roots allowed the appeal on the Article 2 ground (risk of unlawful killing by the Taliban) and the Article 3 ground (risk of torture and/or “the general security and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan in light of his particular vulnerability.”). The judge found that Mr Safi was vulnerable, had been trafficked, was Westernised and was at risk of destitution. The judge explicitly stated that he did not consider the health aspect of the Article 3 claim, nor the Article 8 claim (concerning the Respondent’s connections to the UK and his claimed lack of connections in Afghanistan).

12. The judge found:- “23. This is a deportation appeal. I take full note of the nature of his offending as set out in the papers. Counsel accepted that she could not raise any protection issues in this appeal. As regards articles 2 and 3 she relied upon risk on the basis of his Westernisation and also as a victim of trafficking and the risk of re-trafficking.

24. I find that the Appellant is a vulnerable witness, and this was not disputed. I find that he has the medical conditions as summarised in the skeleton at paragraphs 19 – 23 and as evidenced in the medical evidence. None of that was disputed at the hearing. The Appellant has mild depressive disorder and PTSD.

25. At page 235 of the bundle is the SCA conclusive grounds decision of 9 December 2021. This is a brief conclusive grounds decision and found that he was a victim of modern slavery in various countries including Afghanistan in 2010 for the purposes of sexual exploitation and a victim in the UK from 2011 to 2015 for the purposes of forced criminality.”

13. At [29] the judge, under the heading “Is the Appellant Westernised?”, continued:- “29. Counsel asked the HOPO if he wished to cross examine the Appellant on the particular issue of whether he was Westernised or not, and the HOPO confirmed that he did not. The HOPO did not dispute that the Appellant was Westernised to some extent. On that basis, given the HOPO’s position, there was no cross examination of the Appellant.

30. It is not disputed that the Appellant has been in the UK since December 2010 when he was aged 13.

31. His evidence that he now speaks Pashto with an [accent] was not disputed.

32. The respondent’s current CPIN ( April 2022 - Fear of Taliban) at paragraph 2.4.9 accepts that:- The current evidence suggests that persons likely to be at risk of persecution, because they may be considered a threat or do not conform to the Taliban's strict interpretation of Sharia law, include but are not limited to: • Persons who do not conform to, or are perceived to not conform to, strict cultural and religious expectations/mores, in particular women, and which may also include persons perceived as ‘Westernised’ after having spent time in the West, though no clear definition of what ‘Westernised’ means or entails is available.

33. In addition the Appellant has extensive expert evidence about his risk on return as a Westernised person. None of that evidence was challenged by the HOPO, including the reports of Mr Foxley and Dr Panjwani.”

14. The judge noted that the Home Office Presenting Officer (“HOPO”) had made “very limited submissions” on the issue of Westernisation. He had submitted that it would not be apparent that the Appellant was Westernised; that the Appellant had skills and knowledge of the country; and that he would not be at risk. The judge noted that the HOPO had made no reference to the Country Policy Information Note (“CPIN”) for Afghanistan, nor to the skeleton argument for the Appellant, nor to any of the expert evidence – except that he had accepted the qualifications of the experts.

15. The judge noted at [35J] that Ms Philps, who was counsel for Mr Safi in the FTT, had relied on the two expert reports of Mr Foxley and Dr Panjwani and referred specifically to eight passages in Mr Foxley’s reports. The topics mentioned included the risks if Mr Safi did not appear to fit in; the risk of being targeted by the Taliban due to his period of absence from the country and being seen as Westernised; and the risk of illegal detention and torture. The judge noted that the report of Mr Foxley dated January 2023 was considerably more up to date than the latest CPIN.

16. Finally, under the heading “Application of the Law to the Facts” the judge held:- “37. The standard in an Article 3 appeal is the lower standard i.e that of real risk, as set out above. I have applied that standard.

38. I accept that there is a risk of re-trafficking which would breach article 3, given the SCA decision and the expert evidence (reports of Mr Foxley and Dr Panjwani). There is cogent evidence e.g. pdf 102 of the AB that trafficking is on the increase in Afghanistan.

39. Based on the findings and reasons above - particularly but not exclusively his “ Westernisation”, his vulnerability and the risk of re-trafficking - I find that the Appellant is at risk of treatment on return to Afghanistan which would breach Article 2 and 3. He is at real risk of unlawful killing and other treatment from the Taliban which would breach his human rights under Article 3.

40. I also accept that he is at particular risk of destitution. The expert evidence is that 98% of the population are in poverty. He will have extreme difficulties in finding accommodation, healthcare and employment. I take into account relevant case law such as Ainte (material deprivation - Art 3 - AM (Zimbabwe)) [2021] UKUT 203 (IAC) which stated:- In cases where the material deprivation is not intentionally caused the threshold is the modified N test set out in AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17 . The question will be whether conditions are such that there is a real risk that the individual concerned will be exposed to intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy.

41. For all the same reasons, given all the above findings and the unchallenged expert evidence, along with his particular vulnerabilities (health and as a victim of trafficking) I find that the appellant is at real risk of such material deprivation and destitution on return to Afghanistan and also allow his appeal under article 3 on those grounds.

42. I do not need to consider his claim on article 3 health grounds or Article 8 and I do not do so.”

17. He accordingly allowed the appeal against the deportation order. The Upper Tribunal

18. With permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge (“UTJ”) Pickup the SSHD appealed to the UT under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 . There were two grounds: firstly, that the FTT judgment was inadequately reasoned in regards to the Respondent’s ability to reintegrate into Afghanistan; and secondly, that insufficient regard was had to the country guidance note on the improved security situation in Afghanistan.

19. On 1 March 2024 Thornton J and UTJ Perkins dismissed the SSHD’s appeal from the determination of the FTT allowing Mr Safi’s appeal of the decision of the SSHD refusing his human rights claim in the deportation context. The UT found that the FTTJ had “not given the fullest reasons” but his reasoning was “sufficient to explain his decision” [UT/[4]-[7]]. The UT held that it was: “[…] quite plain from the judge’s decision that he had allowed the claimant’s appeal because of a particular, case specific, combination of reasons a mixture of vulnerability, his history at having been trafficked, his lack of ability to adjust to the country because of his Westernisation and the particular risks he would face.” It was therefore “ clear to a fair minded reader ” that the FTTJ had “accepted the expert evidence” provided by the Respondent and relied upon it in reaching his judgment. Permission to appeal

20. In a decision dated 9 July 2025 (and served on the parties on17 March 2025), UTJ Perkins refused the SSHD’s application for permission to appeal as it was made out of time (having been received six days late). UTJ Perkins further stated that had the application been admitted it would have been refused.

21. The SSHD renewed her application for permission to appeal directly to the Court of Appeal. On 14 August 2025 Lewis LJ granted permission to appeal. He stated that the appeal raised an important point of practice or principle, namely the proper approach to consideration of whether there is a real risk of a breach of Article 2 or Article 3 of the Convention and the extent to which decisions of the FTT need to be reasoned. Country Policy Information Note (April 2022 – Afghanistan: Fear of Taliban)

22. So far as relevant, this provides:- “2.4.9 The current evidence suggests that persons likely to be at risk of persecution, because they may be considered a threat or do not conform to the Taliban's strict interpretation of Sharia law, include but are not limited to: • Persons who do not conform to, or are perceived to not conform to, strict cultural and religious expectations/mores, in particular women, and which may also include persons perceived as ‘Westernised’ after having spent time in the West, though no clear definition of what ‘Westernised’ means or entails is available. 2.4.10 However, not all incidents committed by the Taliban should be considered a systematic campaign of targeting and may be due to Taliban members settling old disputes. Each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they would be at real risk on return. 2.4.11 Whilst conditions have deteriorated and the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has increased since the findings upheld in AS (Safety of Kabul), the humanitarian situation is not so severe that in general, a single adult male in good health is likely to face a real risk of serious harm. This is because the conditions do not amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 2.4.12 However, living conditions in other parts of the country vary, with groups who may be particularly vulnerable to serious harm because of their status and circumstances, such as women, children, the elderly and the disabled, may face a higher risk of a breach of Article 3. Decision makers must consider, on the facts of the case, whether a returnee, by reason of their individual circumstances, would face a real risk of serious harm contrary to paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR as a result of the humanitarian situation.” Grounds of appeal

23. The Appellant (SSHD) advances one ground of appeal: that the Upper Tribunal was wrong to conclude that there was no error of law in the decision of the FTT Judge promulgated on 17 July 2023. There are two strands to this: i) Ground 1.a. The Appellant submits that the FTT misdirected itself, wrongly considering that the general risks and levels of poverty present in Afghanistan were sufficient to allow the human rights appeal. Instead, the correct approach was to consider the risks specific to the Respondent. ii) Ground 1.b. , The Appellant submits that the FTT misdirected itself as to the level of risk necessary to establish an Article 3 breach, failing to consider whether the risks identified amounted to a risk of intense suffering or reduced life expectancy. The FTT wrongly equated evidence of widespread poverty with a risk of destitution.

24. The SSHD invited this court to exercise its jurisdiction under section 14(2) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to set aside the UT’s decision and to re-make the decision.

25. It should be emphasised that this case, unlike many appeals against deportation orders, is not concerned with Article 8 of the ECHR. Where an appellant who has been sentenced to at least four years in custody challenges a deportation order on Article 8 grounds he has to submit the very high threshold laid down by Parliament in section 117 C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 . By contrast, in cases involving an alleged risk on return, the leading case of Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439 is authority for the proposition that the removal of a foreign national from the UK will breach Article 3 ECHR where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be at real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the country of their nationality.

26. Article 3 ECHR can be engaged where the migrant would face conditions of “extreme material deprivation” in the country of return. The test in such cases, as noted by the UT in Ainte (material deprivation – Article 3 – AM (Zimbabwe) [2021] UKUT 203 (IAC) , is whether “conditions are such that there is a real risk that the individual concerned will be exposed to intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy.” [emphasis added] The existence of widespread poverty is not enough. Appellant (SSHD)’s submissions

27. The FFTJ allowed the appeal based on a combination of the Respondent’s vulnerability, his history of having been trafficked, his ‘Westernisation’ and the risk of destitution. The SSHD submits that these findings are not properly reasoned and that none of these factors (individually or cumulatively) evidence a real risk of an Article 2 or Article 3 breach.

28. The Appellant’s submissions on vulnerability, the risk of re-trafficking, Westernisation and the risk of destitution are summarised in turn below.

29. The FTT found that the Respondent was vulnerable as he had mild depressive disorder and PTSD. The FFTJ explicitly stated that he did not consider the health aspect of his Article 3 claim. The Appellant therefore submits that it was wrong to consider general vulnerability as a factor supporting the risk of a breach of Article 2 or 3. The FFTJ has not stated what he found the Respondent vulnerable to, or how this would be manifested after deportation.

30. The FTTJ found that there was a risk of re-trafficking such as would breach Article 3. This was based on the Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) conclusive grounds decision and the expert evidence of Mr Foxley and Dr Panjwani.

31. The SSHD argues that no reasons were given as to why the Respondent is personally at risk of re-trafficking. The SCA conclusive grounds decision dates from 2021 and refers to trafficking and forced criminality dating from no later than 2015, when the Appellant was 18. The FTTJ has not demonstrated why the Appellant is at risk of re-trafficking as an adult a decade later.

32. The FTTJ failed to make any explicit findings on Westernisation, but simply stated that it was a relevant factor in his decision that there was a real risk of an Article 2/3 breach.

33. Both the CPIN and the Respondent’s expert evidence indicated that Westernisation is difficult to measure and does not automatically equate with a risk of an Article 2 or 3 breach.

34. The FTTJ quoted paragraphs 2.4.8 and 2.4.9 of the CPIN cited above, but made no reference to paragraph 2.4.10 which, as noted above, states that not all incidents committed by the Taliban should be considered a systematic campaign of targeting and may be due to Taliban members settling old disputes. Each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they would be at real risk on return.

35. The judge has not provided any reasoning as to why the Respondent is himself at risk. The onus is on the Respondent to demonstrate the risk he faces, and on a proper analysis of the evidence the Respondent has not demonstrated a real risk.

36. The Appellant submits that the FTTJ has failed to explain why the Respondent is particularly at risk of destitution. Moreover, the FTTJ has misdirected himself by wrongly considering that poverty equates to destitution. The threshold for an Article 3 breach is high.

37. Mr Foxley’s expert report stated that 97% of the population are below the poverty line and that 98% of the population have insufficient food. Dr Panjwani stated that one quarter of the labour force was unemployed. The Appellant argues “It is difficult to square a situation where three quarters of the labour force are in work with widespread destitution i.e. a situation where they are facing intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy.”

38. The SSHD submits that the FTTJ has failed to explain why the Respondent as a single adult male in good physical health, faces a real risk of destitution giving rise to the level of an Article 3 breach. Respondent’s submissions

39. The Respondent argues that the Appellant’s grounds disclose no error of law in the FTT’s decision, but amount to a simple disagreement with the FTT’s findings.

40. Mr Symes and Ms Sardar submit that the Respondent is at particular risk in Afghanistan of exploitation, killing by non-state actors, forced recruitment by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and/or destitution. This is due to: a combination of country conditions; the Respondent’s Westernisation; his severely poor mental health; his past experience of trafficking; his lack of family or other support network in Afghanistan; and the publicity given to his offending in the UK.

41. The Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal allege two specific legal errors: reliance on general conditions without regard to the Respondent’s specific circumstances; and misapplication of the Article 3 ECHR destitution test. In her skeleton argument the SSHD introduces a wider case concerning supposedly inadequate reasoning. This goes beyond the Grounds of Appeal, but is nonetheless wrong. The FTT correctly identified the issues in the case before giving focused reasons for resolving those issues in the Respondent’s favour. The expert evidence relied on by the Respondent was unchallenged, therefore the FTT did not need to spend time explaining in detail why it was accepted.

42. The Respondent cited [20-21] of Kapikanya [2025] EWCA Civ 987 , which summarises the approach of an appellate court to considering the reasoning of the FTT.

43. The Respondent submits that the FTT did not wrongly rely on the general country conditions without considering his specific circumstances. The Appellant fails to identify any passage in the FTT’s decision demonstrating that it misdirected itself and wrongly considered the general risks and level of poverty in Afghanistan were sufficient to allow the appeal. Rather, the FTT made numerous references to the particular circumstances of the Respondent. At no point did the FTT suggest that the appeal was being allowed solely on the basis of the general conditions in Afghanistan.

44. The FTT applied the correct test in relation to destitution and Article 3 ECHR, referring at [40] to Ainte. The FTT concluded that the Article 3 threshold was met due to the combination of the general economic conditions in Afghanistan (namely, that 98% of the population is in poverty) and the Respondent’s particular vulnerabilities (namely his health and history as a victim of trafficking).

45. The Respondent submits that the FTT properly took into account the extremely high levels of poverty in Afghanistan as a relevant consideration going towards their assessment of the Respondent’s risk of “destitution”. The FTT went on to refer to and accept the “unchallenged expert evidence” on this issue which assesses the conditions the Respondent in particular would be likely to face in Afghanistan: see in particular Dr Panjwani [93]; Foxley [40]-[41] regarding access to accommodation; Foxley [43]-[51] regarding access to work; Foxley [81]-[86] on the Respondent’s poor mental health and risk of exploitation.

46. The Appellant cites the CPIN which states “the humanitarian situation is not so severe that in general, a single adult male in good health is likely to face a real risk of serious harm”. The Respondent counters this argument by asserting that this was not the Respondent’s case and the FTT found that the Respondent was at risk of destitution because of his particular vulnerabilities, poor mental health, and trauma as an accepted victim of trafficking and childhood sexual exploitation. [RSkel/[25]].

47. The FTT referred to the vulnerability arising from the Respondent’s poor mental health because this was relevant to the risk of re-trafficking; risk of destitution; and risk of unlawful killing / other mistreatment contrary to Article 3. The expert evidence, on which the FTT relied, explains the significance of the Respondent’s vulnerability in the context of these risks.

48. The FTT relied on unchallenged expert evidence to conclude that there was a risk of re-trafficking engaging Article 3 ECHR. The Appellant’s skeleton does not suggest that the FTT was not entitled to accept this evidence, but instead seeks to misrepresent it as suggesting merely a “plausible risk” of ill-treatment on return.

49. The Appellant criticises the FTT, stating that the FTTJ “did not make any explicit findings on this point, simply stating that Westernisation was a relevant factor in his decision that there was a real risk of an Article 2/3 breach.” [ASkel/[17]]. The Respondent notes that ‘Westernisation’ is not an objective measure but an assessment of a range of factors on an individual by individual basis. The HOPO in this instance chose not to cross-examine the Respondent’s evidence regarding the extent to which he was Westernised [FTT/[29]]. The FTT cannot be criticised for proceeding on the basis of that evidence [FTT/[35]].

50. The Appellant’s argument that Westernisation would not “automatically” result in an Article 3 breach is accepted by the Respondent, who notes that the FTT correctly directed itself “not exclusively” to have regard to the Respondent’s degree of Westernisation when considering the matter. The expert evidence demonstrated that the risks from “Westernisation” in Afghanistan were increasing and whilst it did not “guarantee” persecution, it did present “very real risks” [Foxley [33]]. The CPIN reaches the same conclusion at [2.4.10]. The test to be applied by the FTT regarding Westernisation is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of mistreatment that would breach Article 3 ECHR. The FTT correctly applied this test and was entitled to conclude that there was such a risk. Discussion

51. Kapikanya [2025] EWCA Civ 987 is a recent judgment of this court which sets out the correct approach to appellate scrutiny of the reasoning of specialist FTT decisions. At paragraph 20 the following propositions are noted and approved as statements of general principle (there is a sixth, relating to proportionality, which is not relevant for present purposes). They were not disputed before us: “(1) The FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the UT should not rush to find an error of law in its decisions simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently, as the appeal is available only on a point of law: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UK HL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 , at [30]; (2) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010 UKSC 49 [2011] 2 All ER 65 , at [45]; (3) When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 [2013] 2 All ER 625 , at [25]; (4) The issues that the FTT is deciding and the basis on which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 , at [27], and (5) The judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so: see A4 (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 [2020] 4 WLR 145 , at [34].”

52. It is often said that the most important target audience of a judgment is the losing party who needs to understand why they lost. In this case, the Home Office did not lose because of any general finding that adult male Afghans who are convicted of a serious offence in this country cannot be deported to Afghanistan. Rather, they lost because, having been served at the FTT directions hearing with a substantial body of carefully argued expert evidence, in particular the reports of Mr Foxley and Dr Panjwani, they did not seek to challenge them by requiring either of those experts to attend for cross-examination. In those circumstances the HOPO was inevitably in difficulties in putting forward arguments contrary to what the experts had written: see TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2025] AC 374 [2023] UKSC 48 at [70].

53. The reasoning of the FTT in the present case was somewhat compressed, but I agree with the Upper Tribunal that it is sufficient to indicate why the judge allowed the appeal.

54. What the FTT judge had to decide, on the evidence placed before him, was whether there was a real risk on return of Mr Safi being killed (Article 2) or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3). For my part, I doubt whether the judge's findings at paragraphs 40-41 on the issue of a serious risk of destitution causing "intense suffering", had they stood alone, would have provided a sound basis for allowing Mr Safi’s appeal . But those findings are not the most important part of the case. The most significant part of the evidence before the FTT can be summarised as follows: a) Mr Safi is a vulnerable individual who had, in the words of the judge who sent him to prison, a traumatic start in life. His father was murdered by the Afghan army. Subsequently, Mr Safi himself was a victim of childhood trafficking and modern slavery and sexual abuse during his journey to the UK. The Single Competent Authority found that he had indeed been a victim of trafficking. None of this excuses or minimises his offending, but it is important background material. b) The expert report of Dr Panjwani stated that: “Based on my professional expertise, I conclude that if Mr Safi were removed to Afghanistan, he would be at a high risk of being re-trafficked since there are several indicators ranging from his young age, sexual abuse, route to Europe and criminalisation that demonstrate he is a potential victim of trafficking. Moreover, his state of mental health and the lack of mental health infrastructure in the country makes him more vulnerable to be re-trafficked. […] All these factors demonstrate that there is more than a plausible risk of persecution for Mr Safi if he were removed to Afghanistan.” Dr Panjwani also stated that vulnerable men have been significantly more susceptible to being exploited, abused and forced into labour since the Taliban's rise to power in August 2021; c) Mr Foxley's evidence was that the degree of Mr Safi's Westernisation gave substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of mistreatment breaching Article 3.

55. It may be that some of these conclusions, particularly on the consequences of Westernisation, could have been subjected to challenge in the FTT, but the judge had to deal with the case on the basis that there was little if any challenge. In those circumstances, in agreement with the UT, I do not consider that in accepting the expert evidence, particularly that which was specific to the Respondent, the FTT made any error of law. Conclusion

56. I would dismiss this appeal Lord Justice Peter Jackson:

57. I agree. Lady Justice Asplin:

58. I also agree.