Mark Armstrong v The Information Commissioner

The unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the appeal is dismissed. Reasons Introduction

1. On 4 July 2024 Mr Mark Armstrong, the Appellant in these proceedings, submitted a request to the Cleveland Police Force (‘the Force’) under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (‘FOIA’) , asking for the email addresses of the Chief Constable and three other very senior officers. To which any section number mentioned below refers

2. The Force responded on 1 August 2024, providing a link through which any ‘member of staff’ might be contacted. Email addresses were not supplied.

3. Mr Armstrong took issue with that response, arguing that (a) the link supplied did not enable him to make contact with any particular officer since a collar or warrant number was also required and (b) in any event, the Force had not supplied the information requested, namely the individual (work) email addresses.

4. On 4 September 2024. The Force wrote again to Mr Armstrong, citing FOIA, s40(2) and contending that the request asked for personal data and accordingly it was not obliged to confirm or deny whether relevant information was held or to disclose any such information which might be held. Collar numbers were, however, supplied.

5. On 5 September 2024 Mr Armstrong complained to the Respondent (‘the Commissioner’) about the way in which his request for information had been handled. An investigation followed.

6. In the course of the investigation the Force relied for the first time on FOIA, s31 (law enforcement). Most surprisingly, the Commissioner proceeded, by his decision notice of 10 March 2025 (‘the DN’), to uphold the Force’s reliance on s31 without inviting Mr Armstrong’s observations first. Accordingly the complaint was dismissed, although certain procedural breaches on the part of the Force were noted.

7. By a notice of appeal dated 11 March 2025 Mr Armstrong challenged the Commissioner’s adjudication, contending that he had wrongfully determined the complaint without allowing him the chance to make representations on s31 and that the DN was based on an erroneous application of the public interest balancing test, which overwhelmingly favoured disclosure.

8. The Commissioner resisted the appeal in a response dated 6 May 2025, standing by the reasoning in the DN. The Statutory Framework The freedom of information legislation

9. FOIA, s1 includes: (1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled– (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. The duty under subsection (1)(a) is known as ‘the duty to confirm or deny’. ‘Information’ means information ‘recorded in any form’ (s84).

10. By s31, it is provided, relevantly, as follows: (1) Information … is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice — (a) the prevention or detection of crime, (b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders … The exemptions under subsection (1) are qualified, not absolute. In other words, they are to be applied subject to the familiar public interest balancing test under s2(2)(b), which poses the question whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. The structure of FOIA involves an implicit presumption in favour of disclosure. The Tribunal’s powers

11. The appeal is brought pursuant to the FOIA, s57. The Tribunal’s powers in determining the appeal are delineated in s58 as follows: (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal consider – (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law; or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner, and in any other case the tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. Analysis and Conclusions

12. We have reached the clear conclusion that the Force was entitled to rely on s31 and that the public interest balance strongly favours maintenance of the exemption. Disclosure of the email addresses requested would obviously run counter to the public interest in prejudicing the orderly and efficient conduct of police business, as different constitutions of the First-tier Tribunal have held on a number of previous occasions (see for example Lotz v IC and DWP EA/2018/0108 (6 November 2018) and O’Hanlon v IC and Cabinet Office EA/2024/0227 (28 November 2024)). Disclosure under FOIA is to the whole world and publishing email addresses of senior officers would inevitably expose them to increased levels of correspondence and distract them from their core law enforcement obligations.

13. We entirely agree with Mr Armstrong that there is a strong public interest in police forces being accountable and accessible to the public they serve, but it does not follow that there is a public interest in individual email addresses of senior officers being publicly available. There are numerous mechanisms and processes through which citizens may seek to hold police forces to account and/or raise complaints if they feel that they have let them down. These range from internal complaints procedures to the formal powers of the Independent Office for Police Conduct. Democratic oversight is also provided through the system of Police and Crime Commissioners.

14. Mr Armstrong’s complaint about the Commissioner’s failure to confront him with the s31 point is entirely valid, but provides no ground for overturning the DN. We have no jurisdiction to allow the appeal simply to mark our disapproval of the procedure which he followed, in circumstances where we are satisfied that the substance of his decision was correct. Disposal and Postscript

15. For the reasons we have given, the appeal must be dismissed.

16. We stress that our decision rests entirely on our assessment of the legal merits of this information rights dispute. We accept without question that a most serious and disturbing history underlies the case and we sincerely hope that Mr Armstrong and all who have common cause with him will secure the just resolution of their grievances to which they are entitled.

17. The Commissioner’s election to decide the complaint on a ground which Mr Armstrong had had no chance to consider was a most regrettable departure from what any right-thinking person would regard as an elementary principle of fair dealing, namely that both sides of any argument should be heard and considered. We hope that it was an isolated misjudgement. Repeating it would serve only to undermine trust in, and respect for, his important public function of investigating freedom of information disputes impartially and equitably. (Signed) Anthony Snelson Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Dated: 10 December 2025