UK case law
Taktouk, R (on the application of) v His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service
[2025] EWHC ADMIN 2234 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2025
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Full judgment
1. SIR PETER LANE: This is an application for urgent interim relief brought by the claimant, Mr Taktouk. He seeks an order from this court that he be allowed to travel to Lebanon at the beginning of the coming weekend for various purposes. One important purpose that he cites is to attend the Mass in honour of his deceased father which has been set for the very near future. He also wishes to attend a family wedding, involving his cousin, which has been fixed for early August. Additionally, he wishes to be able to visit the grave of his father in Lebanon. Finally, he raises the issue regarding a very elderly aunt who is said to be approaching her end and whom he would very much wish to see before she dies,
2. The claimant was released from custody in February 2025. He had been serving a seven-year sentence. He tells me he should have been released towards the end of last year but remained in custody owing to a criminal compensation matter. However, that was resolved in his favour by the Court of Appeal earlier this year. The fact remains, however, that he has only relatively recently been released from a significant period of incarceration.
3. The claimant applied to the defendant's probation service earlier this year for permission to go to Lebanon for the aforementioned purposes. The conditions of his licence, which remain for some years, are such that he requires the probation service's permission in order to travel abroad. There is a published policy issued by HM Prison and Probation Service that deals with these matters. I shall return to that shortly.
4. Concerned by the fact that he had not received a decision in response to his request, the claimant commenced judicial review proceedings against the defendant, challenging what he contended was their unlawful failure to make the decision.
5. The matter was considered on the papers at the end of June 2025 by a Deputy Judge who made directions. One of those was that the defendant was directed to file an acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of defence by 7 July. Whether or not prompted by the deputy judge's directions, the defendant made a decision in respect of the claimant's request to travel on 4 July. It is in the name of Tasneem Tahir, the probation service's officer in Hammersmith and Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster. It states as follows: "Following our telephone conversation on 4 July 2024, I am writing to formally confirm that your request to travel to Lebanon from 16 July to 20 August has been declined by the Head of Service. This decision has been made after careful consideration and is based on the following grounds: • The reason provided for travel does not meet the exceptional criteria required for approval. While we acknowledge your wish to visit your father's final resting place, this does not necessitate a five-week absence abroad, particularly when combined with attendance at a wedding. • As you are aware, you were given a seven-year custodial sentence and your current licence conditions explicitly state you are not permitted to travel abroad without prior approval from your probation practitioner. We appreciate your understanding in this matter. Should you have any further questions or wish to discuss this decision, please do not hesitate to get in touch".
6. The defendant filed its acknowledgment of service and summary grounds on 7 July. That has elicited a response from the claimant to which I shall refer in due course.
7. Papers in the judicial review were then placed in front of another Deputy High Court Judge. On 21 July 2025, she refused an interim relief application. She also made further directions concerning the claimant's amending of his grounds of claim to challenge the decision of 4 July, now that it had been made. The claimant says that he has complied with the direction of the Deputy Judge so far as he is concerned, although, initially, there was some issue regarding the submission of certain forms which appears to have concerned the defendant. The claimant tells me that this has now been resolved. The time for the defendant to serve its response to the amended grounds has not yet arrived.
8. One of the matters, as I understand it, which the claimant wishes to raise in the amended grounds is an article 3 ECHR challenge to the defendant's actions, not just in respect of the decision of 4 July, but overall concerning its conduct so far as he is concerned.
9. All of that means that, whatever the outcome of today's interim application, I am not in a position to decide whether permission should be refused to bring the judicial review.
10. I do, however, have to have regard to the materials, including the latest exchanges following the decision of 4 July, because I must be satisfied that there is a good arguable case upon which to grant interim relief. I must also be satisfied that, if there is such a case, the balance of convenience favours granting relief. In that regard, I note that what is sought today would, in a very real sense, amount to the resolution of the original challenge by way of judicial review, in that it would give the claimant everything he is asking.
11. I therefore turn to consider whether there is a good arguable case. I have had close regard to what the claimant says, both in his written documentation and in his oral submissions. I do not doubt at all the claimant's good faith in all that he has told me. I understand his desire to attend the Mass that will be held to honour his father and his desire to see his father's grave. I also note his wish to attend a family gathering and to see his aunt. The genuineness of his desire in these respects is not in issue. What is in issue is whether he has a good case for showing, as matters currently stand, that the decision was wrong in law.
12. The relevant policy to which I have made reference sets out the requirements for travel abroad on licence, beginning at part 3. At part 3.4, I note that, both temporary and permanent travel require the individual themselves to make an application based on the criteria that are set out in the following sections, providing any evidence as is required to back up their application. Paragraph 3.6 states there is an expectation with both types of external travel that the individual would have been in the community for a period sufficiently long enough that the understanding of risk can be updated and considered against the criteria for travel where needed. In this regard, there is said to be no set period of time. That will vary based on the intensity of supervision.
13. However, when there is a specific time sensitive situation which requires the individual's presence overseas, this requirement may be bypassed with the approval of senior management.
14. Paragraph 4.3 deals, amongst other things, with a wish to visit a sick or elderly relative living overseas. However, it is stated that independently verifiable medical evidence must be provided which shows that the family member has a limited life expectancy or a degenerating mental illness.
15. At 4.5, we see this: "Travel of this type was previously referred to as only being given in exceptional circumstances. Whether these circumstances are exceptional or not are based on whether the individual's application meets the following set of criteria".
16. There are then set out criteria under headings A to G. A asks whether the individual needs to travel abroad to undertake the activity. B is whether benefits would be realised if the travel was deferred until after the end of the licence period. Would the travel interfere with reporting requirements or attendance and is the senior manager satisfied that the individual could be trusted to return?
17. Throughout, the thrust of the guidance is that there must be a reason why there is a need to travel abroad rather than, perhaps, to utilise some other form of communication.
18. In its summary grounds of defence, the defendant takes issue with the challenge in the judicial review brought by reference to articles 8 and 9 of the ECHR. The defendant contends that the refusal of permission to travel does not breach the claimant's article 8 rights. The decision was taken in accordance with the applicable policy that requires exceptional circumstances to justify travel abroad while on licence. The defendant, it is said, was entitled to conclude that the personal and family reasons cited, including attending a memorial service, a wedding and visits to relatives, did not breach the requisite threshold for a five-week trip abroad. The defendant noted in the decision, while acknowledging the importance of the claimant's wish to see his father's' burial place, that this did not necessitate a five-week absence abroad.
19. The summary grounds contend that the claimant's right to manifest his religion is not disproportionately interfered with – he remains free to practise his religion in the United Kingdom.
20. The summary grounds further assert that the policy was lawfully applied. In considering the claimant's risk, it was determined that he did not meet the paragraph 4.5 criteria for exceptional circumstances: in particular 4.5(b) requires the decision maker to assess whether the benefits to the individual of the proposed travel could instead be realised if the travel is deferred until after the end of the licence period. The defendant says it was reasonably concluded that the proposed travel could be deferred until after the end of the licence period without depriving them of their intended benefit to visit their family.
21. As for urgent consideration, it is noted in the summary grounds that the wedding is not due to take place until 8 August and the other events referred to in his claim could either be adapted or organised from the United Kingdom.
22. The claimant takes issue with the summary grounds of defence. He points out that he was unable to attend through the misfeasance, he says, of the prison authorities, the funeral of his father who died in 2020 and whose funeral service took place in the United Kingdom. There is said to be a hearing due in respect of a compensation claim in that regard later this summer.
23. The claimant argues that his attendance at a religious memorial Mass at the church next to his fathers' grave would not be inappropriate. He is needed as the eldest son of his father to lead the prayer services, consistent with the Lebanese Christian tradition. His elderly aunt is the only surviving sibling of his late father and the wedding involves what is said to be a rare extended family gathering, with relatives having not seen each other since 2019.
24. As for the concern expressed by the defendant regarding the five-week duration, the claimant points out the overlapping religious, familial and cultural obligations on him. He also contends that the defendant has failed to consider proportionate alternatives. That is a point taken up in other materials from the claimant where he submits the defendant could have proposed other timescales. Indeed, he made that point forcefully to me at the hearing today.
25. Brief though the decision is, I do not consider that it can be said, as matters currently stand, that the claimant has a good arguable case to challenge it in public law terms. Plainly, the length of the absence abroad concerned the defendant, when set against the lengthy prison sentence from which the claimant had been only recently released. Although he is subject only to monthly reporting conditions, he tells me that those are conducted by telephone. The defendant plainly was entitled to be concerned about a long absence abroad occurring so shortly after release from a lengthy sentence of imprisonment.
26. I do not accept, with respect, that the claimant is on good ground when he says that it was for the defendant to come back to suggest alternative periods during which he might be permitted to go to Lebanon. The onus is on the claimant to make a case by reference to the criteria. I also note that the defendant, in its decision, expressly held open the possibility of further discussions. It may well be that a shorter period, perhaps limited to or for the express purpose of seeing living relatives in Lebanon and attending the grave of his father would elicit a different response. As it is, however, the defendant was faced with the application that was made to it.
27. I am not persuaded that there is merit in the contention that the exceptionality criteria have been dropped from the guidance and the opening words of paragraph 4.5 of the guidance, which I have quoted, show that not to be the case. Rather, the exceptional circumstances are now sought to be defined in the paragraphs that follow the opening words of 4.5; in particular and importantly, whether the travel could be deferred.
28. The urgency of the present application is also, in my view, somewhat undermined by the claimant's very frank information given to me today that the memorial service was originally fixed for a point in time some weeks earlier, but which was then postponed. That suggests that it is not a fixed event. Whilst one can understand why it might be thought convenient for the event to coincide with the wedding, that is a matter of convenience, rather than anything else. Plainly, the claimant is a central figure in the proposed memorial service given that he is the eldest son. The issue, therefore, arises as to whether the memorial service could be rescheduled. If it was to be held earlier this year, then such of the family who are be due to gather in Lebanon for the wedding, would not, in any event, have been available for the memorial service.
29. The claimant is dismissive of the ability to appear by video link, whether it be the memorial service or, indeed, to see his relatives, including perhaps his aunt. It is true, of course, that face-to-face contact and participation are usually to be preferred to remote means of communication. However, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic, many people across the world have become used to communicating by remote means, including, importantly, in religious and family contexts.
30. I, therefore, do not consider that, for the purposes of this application, a sufficiently arguable case has been made out. I have also said why I am not persuaded that the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction.
31. There is also a very strong possibility of a reformulated request, relating to, in particular, visiting the father's grave, finding favour with the defendant, provided that the time period proposed is not long. Such a reformulated request would also, of course, be made at a later stage following the claimant's release than the request which has elicited these proceedings.
32. I reiterate what I have said earlier.
33. I am not in any way questioning the good faith, sincerity and, indeed, emotional feelings of the claimant. However, for the reasons I have given, his application for urgent interim relief must be refused. _________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected]