Shawbrook Bank Limited · DRN-6265120

The complaint Mrs E and Mrs E’s complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited – (“Shawbrook”) (the ‘Lender’) acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA. What happened Mrs E and Mr E were members of a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’) – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I’ll call the ‘Fractional Club’ – which they bought on 10 July 2019 (the ‘Time of Sale’). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1380 fractional points at a cost of £18,822 (the ‘Purchase Agreement’). Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mrs E and Mr E more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after their membership term ends. Mrs E and Mr E paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £22,554 from the Lender (the ‘Credit Agreement’), which included lending to cover a previous credit agreement for an earlier loan (from a different lender) to pay for trial membership. Mrs E and Mr E – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender on 19 January 2022 (the ‘Letter of Complaint’) to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven’t changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above. The Lender initially dealt with Mrs E and Mr E’s concerns as a dispute, which they answered 11 March 2022. The Lender later logged a complaint and issued its final response letter on 20 September 2022, rejecting it on every ground. The complaint was then assessed by an Investigator from the Financial Ombudsman Service who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits. Mrs E and Mr E disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me.

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The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context here. I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the ‘PD’) dated 6 January 2026. In that decision, I said: What I’ve provisionally decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not think this complaint should be upheld. However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it. Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s misrepresentations at the Time of Sale The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier. Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn’t dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I’ll come on to below, it isn’t necessary to make any formal findings on them here. It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mrs E and Mr E were: 1. Told that they had purchased an investment that would “considerably appreciate in value”. 2. Promised a considerable return on their investment because they were told that they would own a share in a property that would considerably increase in value. 3. Told that they could sell their Fractional Club membership to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit. 4. Made to believe that they would have access to “the holiday apartment” at any time all year round. However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier’s properties was not untrue. And even if the

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Supplier’s sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn’t any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held. As for points 3 and 4, while it’s possible that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for one or both of those reasons, I don’t think it’s probable. They’re given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made false statements of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn’t any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented for these reasons, I don’t think it was. So, while I recognise that Mrs E and Mr E - and the PR - have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I’ve set out above, I’m not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don’t think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? I’ve already explained why I’m not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next. Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs E and Mr E and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at: 1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier; 3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; 4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant 5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement. I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs E and Mr E and the Lender. The Supplier’s sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale Mrs E and Mr E’s complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons. The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren’t carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs E and Mr E. I haven’t seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs E and Mr E was actually unaffordable before also concluding that

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they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for Mrs E and Mr E. Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn’t permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs E and Mr E knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn’t look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn’t have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can’t see why that led to Mrs E and Mr E’s financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I’m not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn’t arranged properly. The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can’t see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs E and Mr E in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I’m not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy. I acknowledge that Mrs E and Mr E may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14- day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. I did note their comments and it’s apparent that Mrs E was also dealing with serious medical issues at the time. She believes this affected her ability to use the 14-day cancellation period because she was dealing with those matters on her return. If Mrs E and Mr E wanted to cancel the agreement, they had the opportunity to do it very shortly after the day of the presentation. I say this because they were taking time out of their trip to try and get in touch with the Supplier (which Mrs E and Mr E said was not successful), so it’s not unreasonable that they could also have cancelled the agreement with either the Supplier, the Lender or both at that point. The forms for cancelling the agreement had already been provided and just needed to be transmitted (by post or email) in order for the cancellation to take effect. Whilst I appreciate that Mrs E had serious medical matters to attend to on their return, I don’t think this outweighs the opportunity they had at the time to cancel – particularly when they’ve said they had every intention of cancelling that agreement and we’re emailing the Supplier to arrange a discussion. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs E and Mr E made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier. Overall, therefore, I don’t think that Mrs E and Mr E’s credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that’s the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way.

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The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs E and Mr E’s Fractional Club membership met the definition of a “timeshare contract” and was a “regulated contract” for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations. Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale: “A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.” But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mrs E and Mr E were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value. The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs E and Mr E the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se. In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs E and Mr E as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs E and Mr E, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them. On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs E and Mr E as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3).

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However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision. Was the credit relationship between the Lender and the Consumer rendered unfair? Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs E and Mr E and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs E and Mr E and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration. But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when they decided to go ahead with their purchase. Mrs E and Mr E provided a statement to PR, which was then forwarded to us. This was received 4 December 2023 although the document was said to have been generated 14 April 2021. The statement contained little information about the role that the investment element of the membership made in their decision to complete the purchase. There’s little reference to the prospect of financial gain apart from: “[…] He told us that at the end of the agreement we would get a nice lump sum and we were at that point so confused and now doubting ourselves that we said we would let him go and see what he could do.” Mrs E and Mr E’s statement made as much, if not more of other aspects of the purchase decision such as the pressure to sign, personal issues, what happened on the day leading up to the agreement, the loan being signed, and the lack of availability of the chosen accommodation. There’s insufficient detail here to enable me to conclude that the investment element was a motivating factor in their decision to enter the agreement. Of course, that doesn’t mean they weren’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs E and Mr E themselves don’t persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don’t think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mrs E and Mr E ultimately made. On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs E and Mr E’s decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests they would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs E and Mr E and the Lender was unfair to them

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even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). Mrs E and Mr E’s Commission Complaint I note that one of Mrs E and Mr E’s other concerns relates to alleged payments of commission by the Lender to the Supplier for acting as a credit broker and arranging the Credit Agreement. The Supreme Court’s recent judgment Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (‘Johnson, Wrench and Hopcraft’) clarified the law on payments of commission – albeit in the context of car dealers acting as credit brokers. In my view, the Supreme Court’s judgment sets out principles which appear capable of applying to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, once I know more about the commission arrangements relevant to Mrs E and Mr E’s complaint, I will address this aspect of the complaint before finalising my thoughts overall. In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs E and Mr E’s Section 75 claim, and I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them. The Lender responded to the PD and confirmed they had nothing further to add. They also advised the commission figure paid on the loan. The PR also responded – they did not accept the PD and provided some further comments and evidence they wish to be considered. Following the PD, I sent a separate letter to both parties outlining my thoughts on the matter of commission. Neither party responded. Having received the relevant responses from both parties, I’m now finalising my decision. The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways. no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant:

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The Consumer Credit Sourcebook (‘CONC’) – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority’s (the ‘FCA’) Handbook of Rules and Guidance Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time: • CONC 3.7.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.2 [G] The FCA’s Principles The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses (‘PRIN’). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint: • Principle 6 • Principle 7 • Principle 8 What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Following the responses from both parties, I’ve considered the case afresh and having done so, I’ve reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons. Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn’t to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven’t commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn’t mean I haven’t considered it. Rather, I’ve focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision. The PR’s further comments in response to the PD in the main relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs E and Mr E and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs E and Mr E as an investment at the Time of Sale. As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But they didn’t make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, they haven’t said they disagree with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven’t been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I’ll focus here on the PR’s points raised in response. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations

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As I explained in my PD, there is little evidence to support Mrs E and Mr E’s assertion that they were motivated to make the decision to enter the agreement based on the prospect of financial gain (i.e. a profit). On the contrary their submission centres around other aspects of their experience apart from any decision to enter the agreement because it was an opportunity for financial gain. So, I wasn’t persuaded that the evidence suggested that Mrs E and Mr E purchased Fractional Club membership in whole or in part down to any breach of Regulation 14(3). Whilst there hasn’t been any further evidence provided, the PR did respond to my PD, making several arguments about the assessment of the evidence. It was said that: • Enjoyment of holidays and the prospect of a profit aren’t mutually exclusive in respect of Mrs E and Mr E’s motivations to enter the agreement. • Mrs E and Mr E are “commercially unsophisticated individuals” and were at a disadvantage. It’s not surprising they did not use “technical investment terminology” and were simply recounting their experience as laypersons. They relied on what they were told by the Supplier. • Mrs E and Mr E’s comment “at the end of the agreement we would get a nice lump sum” is sufficient to meet the definition of an investment in respect of this PD– “an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit.” I’ve thought carefully about these comments and whilst they don’t change my overall position, I did want to explain my thoughts. I’m not arguing the position that only one element was considered by Mrs E and Mr E when they made their decision to enter the agreement. There’s no doubt several factors that led them to enter the agreement, but here, my assessment based on an objective review of the evidence is that the prospect of financial gain wasn’t one of them. I do want to make it clear that I haven’t made any decision because, in the PRs words Mrs E and Mr E are “commercially unsophisticated individuals”. Simply that there’s little for me to conclude they did enter the agreement based on the prospect of financial gain (i.e. a profit) and whilst I acknowledge the definition (which is repeated in the PD) – I don’t think that Mrs E and Mr E have sufficiently detailed their thoughts about the prospect of financial gain. Within their four page detailed recollections in which they describe meetings in some detail, there’s a distinct lack of mention of making the decision to enter the agreement based on the hope of a financial gain. As I’ve already mentioned, the one reference to a lump sum is insufficient evidence for me to conclude that they were motivated by a desire to make an investment. So, ultimately, for the above reasons, along with those I already explained in my PD, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to Mrs E and Mr E’s purchasing decision. The PR also said that in the judgment handed down in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as I explained in my provisional decision, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances. So, as I said before, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an

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investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I’m not persuaded Mrs E and Mr E’s decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, I still don’t think the credit relationship between Mrs E and Mr E and the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale. As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (‘Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench’). The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough. However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors: 1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair” (see paragraph 327); 2. The failure to disclose the commission; and 3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender. The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA: 1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit; 2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates); 3. The characteristics of the consumer; 4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and 5. Compliance with the regulatory rules. From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I’m required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Dispute Resolution Rules (‘DISP’).

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But I don’t think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mrs E and Mr E in arguing that their credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. I haven’t seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Mrs E and Mr E , nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs E and Mr E into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have. I acknowledge that it’s possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. But as I’ve said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn’t necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don’t think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs E and Mr E. In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson’s case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mrs E and Mr E entered into wasn’t high. At £1,127.70, it was only 5% of the amount borrowed and even less than that (4.63%) as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had they known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I’m not currently persuaded that they either wouldn’t have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the payment at that time. After all, Mrs E and Mr E wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of their own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit they needed for a timeshare they wanted doesn’t strike me as disproportionate. So, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed. What’s more, based on what I’ve seen so far, the Supplier’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn’t acting as an agent of Mrs E and Mr E but as the supplier of contractual rights they obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ to them when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty. Overall, therefore, I’m not persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs E and Mr E. I will also address the PR’s point regarding the apparent ambiguity in the proposed sale date of the Allocated Property. The PR suggests that a delayed sale date could lead to an unfairness to Mrs E and Mr E in the future, as any delay could mean a delay in the realisation of their share in the Allocated Property.

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It does appear that the proposed date for the commencement of the sales process, as set out on the owners’ certificate, is 31 December 2037. This same date is set out under point 1 of the Members Declaration, which has been initialled and signed as being read by Mrs E and Mr E. This date indicates that the membership has a term of 18 years. The ambiguity identified by the PR is that in the Information Statement provided as part of the purchase documentation it says the following: “The Owning Company will retain such Allocated Property until the automatic sale date in 19 years time or such later date as is specified in the Rules or the Fractional Rights Certificate.” (bold my emphasis). It seems clear to me that the commencement date for the start of the sales process is 31 December 2037. This actual date is repeated in the sales documentation as I’ve set out above. So, I can’t see that this is a reason to find the credit relationship unfair and uphold this complaint. S140A conclusion Given all of the factors I’ve looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I’m not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs E and Mr E and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to them. So, I don’t think it is fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis. Commission: The Alternative Grounds of Complaint While I’ve found that Mrs E and Mr E credit relationship with the Lender wasn’t unfair to them for reasons relating to the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, two of the grounds on which I came to that conclusion also constitute separate and freestanding complaints to Mrs E and Mr E complaint about an unfair credit relationship. So, for completeness, I’ve considered those grounds on that basis here. The first ground relates to whether the Lender is liable for the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty by the Supplier because it took a payment of commission from the Lender without telling Mrs E and Mr E (i.e., secretly). And the second relates to the Lender’s compliance with the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. However, for the reasons I set out above, I’m not persuaded that the Supplier – when acting as credit broker – owed Mrs E and Mr E a fiduciary duty. So, the remedies that might be available at law in relation to the payment of secret commission aren’t, in my view, available to them. And while it’s possible that the Lender failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between it and the Supplier, I don’t think any such failure on the Lender’s part is itself a reason to uphold this complaint because, for the reasons I also set out above, I think they would still have taken out the loan to fund their purchase at the Time of Sale had there been more adequate disclosure of the commission arrangements that applied at that time. Conclusion In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs E and Mr E’s Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under

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the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them. My final decision My final decision is that I do not uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mrs E and Mr E to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. David Perry Ombudsman

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